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Note
The Antitrust Implications of Employee Noncompete
Agreements: A Labor Market Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Employers often require workers in many occupations, par-
ticylarly those requiring a high degree of specialized training,
to enter into postemployment noncompetition agreements.'
The noncompete agreements commonly restrain such employ-
ees from carrying on their vocations within a prescribed geo-
graphic area, for a specific length of time, after ending their
current employment.2 Although the common law offers some
protection of employer interests, noncompete agreements have
provided employers with a heightened level of protection that,
in their view, more adequately guards their interests. While
most former employees do not contest these agreements, their
wide-ranging effects have given rise to frequent challenges.
Courts currently analyze the validity of noncompete agree-
ments almost exclusively under state contract law,3 largely fail-
1. One commentator has observed that, although empirical data on usage
of noncompete agreements seems to be lacking, an "armchair survey of the
state cases decided each year reveals extensive use. Furthermore, reason ex-
ists to believe that the number of decisions reported constitutes only the pro-
verbial iceberg's tip." Sullivan, Revisiting the "Neglected Stepchild" Antitrust
Treatment of Post Employment Restraints of Trade, 1977 U. ILu- L.F. 621, 622-23.
"For every covenant that finds its way to court, there are thousands which ex-
ercise an in terrorem effect on employees who respect their contractual obliga-
tions ... ." Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L REv. 625,
682 (1960). See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983, 1008 (D. Conn.
1978). Dissatisfied employees may be faced with the prospect of moving be-
yond the agreement's geographic reach, switching occupations, or never leaving
their employment.
2. See, e.g., Annot., 41 A.LR. 2d 15 (1955); Annot, 43 A.LR. 2d 94 (1955).
3. See Blake, supra note 1, at 628 n.8; Goldschmid, Antitrust's Neglected
Stepchild: A Proposal for Dealing with Restrictive Covenants Under Federal
Law, 73 CoLuM. L. REv. 1193, 1204 (1973); Janssen, Antitrust Considerations in
Proceedings Against Former Employees Who Compete Against Their Former
Employer, 31 Bus. LAw. 2063, 2072 (1976); Sullivan, supra note 1, at 626; Wetzel,
Employment Contracts and Noncompetition Agreements, 1969 U. ILT L.F. 61, 67.
See also Bradford v. The New York Times Co., 501 F.2d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1974).
Goldschmid notes:
[F] ederal antitrust laws, with rare and tangential exceptions, have not
been applied to restrictive covenants. The modern citations ... are to
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ing to consider the antitrust implications of these agreements,
either as affirmative defenses in suits to enforce the covenants,
or as independent actions. The few courts that have considered
the validity of these restrictive covenants under the antitrust
laws have held them enforceable. 4 Since courts have not con-
ducted a complete antitrust analysis, they may have enforced
illegal restrictions. The decisions have erroneously focused on
the agreements' anticompetitive impacts on the market for the
employer's product instead of on the market for the employee's
labor,5 where the major antitrust effects occur.
This Note examines the traditional legal analysis of
noncompete agreements under state contract law, and the cur-
rently limited application of federal antitrust law. An analysis
of the cases shows that state contract law inadequately pro-
tects both employee and public interests, and that the courts,
by focusing antitrust protection on the product market, have
rendered its protection ineffective. This Note proposes that
courts should apply antitrust law instead of state contract law
in their analysis of noncompete agreements, and that courts
should consider the anticompetitive effects of such agreements
on the labor market instead of on the product market. This
shift in emphasis will allow a more complete assessment of the
advantages and disadvantages of noncompete agreements.
H. TRADITIONAL LEGAL ANALYSIS OF NONCOMPETE
AGREEMENTS
Noncompete agreements ancillary to legitimate employ-
ment or sale of business contracts6 have been held valid under
state contract law if "reasonable" in light of the circumstances. 7
This test requires courts to weigh three factors: the restraint
-. cases decided under state-not federal-law. It appears that fed-
eral enforcement agencies and private litigants have either concluded
that state law is adequately policing the area or that federal antitrust
statutes are not applicable to this field. . .. [T]here is little basis for
either view.
Goldschmid, supra, at 1193.
4. See note 25 infra and accompanying text.
5. See notes 27, 48-63 infra and accompanying text.
6. The rule is that a mere covenant not to compete is an invalid restraint
of trade. A valid covenant must be made in conjunction with a lawful contract,
such as an employment or sale of business contract, where it is more likely to
be necessary to protect legitimate business interests. See United States v. Ad-
dyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281-82 (6th Cir. 1898), affid as modified, 175
U.S. 211 (1899).
7. See note 23 infra.
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must be no greater than is required to protect the employer;8 it
must not impose undue hardship on the employee;9 and it must
not be injurious to the public.o
Courts use many criteria to decide the extent of the em-
ployer's interest. The employee's departure must present a
substantial risk either to the employer's customer relations or
to the employer's confidential business information." In as-
sessing the risk to customer relations, courts consider the fre-
quency of the employee's customer contact, whether the
employer has any contact with the customers other than
through the employee, the locale of the contact, and the nature
of the employee's activity.12 The strength of the employer's in-
terest in confidential business information depends on the na-
ture of the information and on the reasonable protective
measures the employer already has taken.13
If the courts find a protectible employer interest, they next
examine the hardship the restraint imposes on the employee.
Recognizing that persons should not be able to deprive them-
selves of all employment opportunities, courts consider
8. See, e.g., Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 62
Ohio L. Abs. 17, 20, 105 N.E.2d 685, 687, 691 (C.P. Cuyahogo County 1952) (pro-
viding a bibliography of relevant sources).
9. See Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 119 N.H. 679, 683, 406 A.2d 1310,
1313 (1979); Kennedy v. Wackenhut Corp., 41 Ore. App. 275, 281, 599 P.2d 1126,
1133 (Ore. App. 1979); Pemco Corp. v. Rose, 257 S.E.2d 885, 891 (W. Va. 1979)
(covenant unduly oppressive of employee's right to use his unique personal
qualities).
10. See, e.g., Unishops, Inc. v. May's Family Centers, Inc., 399 N.E.2d 760,
764 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980), Pemco Corp. v. Rose, 257 S.E.2d 885, 890 (W. Va. 1979).
Cf. Foti v. Cook, 200 Va. 800, 805, 263 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1980); (partnership
noncompete agreement). See also RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTS §§ 513-15
(1932); Blake, supra note 1, at 648-49. Blake notes that the public injury factor
is broader in the case law than in the Restatement, which limits the injury to a
tendency or purpose to create a monopoly. Id.
11. See Orchard Container Corp. v. Orchard, 601 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980); Continental Research Corp. v. Scholz, 595 S.W.2d 396, 400 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980); Ennis v. Interstate Distrib., Inc., 598 S.W.2d 903, 907 (Tex. Civ. App.
1980); Blake, supra note 1, at 653.
12. See Import Motors Inc. v. Luker, 599 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Ark. Ct. App.
1980); Uni-Worth Enterprises, Inc. v. Wilson, 244 Ga. 636, 638-39, 261 S.E.2d 572,
575 (1979); Continental Research Corp. v. Scholz, 595 S.W.2d at 396, 401 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980); Ibur & Assocs. Adjustment Co. v. Walsh, 595 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980); Blake, supra note 1, at 659.
13. Blake, supra note 1, at 674. An employer should, for example, limit dis-
closure of confidential information to a few selected employees, and advise
them of the importance of its confidentiality. See also Truly Nolen Exterminat-
ing, Inc. v. Blackwell, 125 Ariz. 481, 482, 610 P.2d 483, 484 (Ct. App. 1980); Captain
& Co. v. Towne, 404 N.E.2d 1159, 1162 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) ("employer is not enti-
tled to protection from an employee's use of his knowledge, skill or general in-
formation .... " (citation omitted)).
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whether enforcing the agreement will eliminate all opportuni-
ties to find work. Noncompete agreements may severely re-
strict an employee's job opportunities within a particular
market. Employers may also view job applicants subject to
such agreements as less attractive potential employees.14
Courts use no specific tests in evaluating these considerations,
but their analyses often follow a general guideline that cove-
nants are invalid if too broad in prohibition of employee activi-
ties, too long in duration, or too wide in geographical
restraint.15
After consideration of employer and employee interests,
courts next examine the agreement's effect on public inter-
ests.16 The agreement's adverse effect on the provision of serv-
ices17 and its beneficial effect on the creation of employment
opportunities 8 are two of the few public impacts that courts
14. See Blake, supra note 1, at 627; Sullivan, supra note 1, at 640; Note, Em-
ployee Nondisclosure Covenants and Federal Antitrust Law, 71 COLUM. L. REV.
417, 424-27 (1971); Note, Antitrust Implications Arising From the Use of Overly
Broad Restrictive Covenants for the Protection of Trade Secrets, 29 HASTINGS
L.J. 297, 307-08 (1977).
15. See Marconi, Inc. v. Waldron, 244 Ga. 169, 171, 259 S.E.2d 433, 434 (1979);
Raymundo v. Hammond Clinic Ass'n, 405 N.E.2d 65, 68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). For
analyses of reasonableness of restraints on activity, see Puritan/Churchill
Chem. Co. v. Eubank, 245 Ga. 334, 335, 265 S.E.2d 16, 17 (1980); TV Tempo, Inc. v.
TV Venture, Inc., 244 Ga. 776, 779, 262 S.E.2d 54, 55 (1979); Uni-Worth Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Wilson, 244 Ga. 636, 638-39, 261 S.E.2d 572, 575 (1979). For cases
discussing duration, see Snelling & Snelling, Inc. v. Dupay Enterprises, Inc., 125
Ariz. 362, 364, 609 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Ct. App. 1980); Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Payseur,
78 Ill. App. 3d 230, 235-36, 396 N.E.2d 1246, 1251 (Ct. App. 1979). For cases dis-
cussing geographic restraints, see Snelling & Snelling, Inc., 125 Ariz. at 364, 609
P.2d at 1064; Interstate Transp., Inc. v. Syfan, 154 Ga. App. 413, 414, 268 S.E.2d
751, 752 (1980); Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Payseur, 78 II1. App. 3d at 235, 396 N.E.2d
at 1251; Stocks v. Banner Am. Corp., 599 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
16. But courts often do not proceed to this final step of the traditional anal-
ysis. See Blake, supra note 1, at 686-87. Of five recent cases that mentioned
public policy or the public interest as one of the standards a noncompete agree-
ment must be measured against, none actually analyzed the agreement at hand
in light of that standard. All simply asserted, without explanation, that the
agreement was or was not against the public interest. See Truly Nolen Exter-
minating, Inc. v. Blackwell, 125 Ariz. 481, 482, 610 P.2d 483, 484 (1980); Import
Motors, Inc. v. Luker, 599 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Ark. 1980); Rebsamen Ins. v. Milton,
600 S.W.2d 441 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980); Raymundo v. Hammond Clinic Ass'n, 405
N.E.2d 65, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Captain & Co. v. Towne, 404 N.E.2d 1159, 1162
(Ind. Ct. App. 1980); cf. Operations Research, Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc.,
241 Md. 550, 575, 217 A.2d 375, 389 (1966) (dicta acknowledging public interest;
suit for employee breach of trust).
17. See Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181, 189, 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 350 (Q.B.
1711) (baker's noncompete agreement limits bakery services in town). See also
Odess v. Tayler, 282 Ala. 389, 211 So. 2d 805 (1968) (covenant preventing ear,
nose, and throat specialist from practicing within 50 miles of city held invalid as
against interest of public).
18. An oil company, for example, may need to hire and train a new sales
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consider. Courts have also used the public interest component
to examine whether a noncompete agreement that is otherwise
reasonable between an employer and an employee may none-
theless be invalid because it creates, or threatens to create, a
monopoly.19 The courts have used a stringent standard in con-
sidering whether a restraint's effect on competition in the em-
ployer's industry amounts to a monopoly. Since usually at
least one other firm provides the same product or service as the
employee's ex-firm, courts have held that enforcement of the
noncompete agreement does not give the enforcing employer a
monopoly.20 Of the courts addressing the monopoly argument,
only one found a restraint partially unenforceable because of
its impact on competition,21 while others found no threatening
monopoly and thus no impact on competition. 22
Although the public interest in preventing restraints on
competition is reflected in the antitrust laws, courts have rarely
applied antitrust law to noncompete agreements. 23 Section 1 of
the Sherman Act proscribes "every contract ... in restraint of
representative if covenants not to compete prevent all existing sales represent-
atives from leaving their jobs. See Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157,
166-67, 98 N.W.2d 415, 421 (1959) (observing that courts must weigh benefits that
accrue to public from covenant's creation of employment opportunities).
19. See RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTs §§ 513-15 (1932); cf. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs §§ 188(1) (b) & (2) (b) (1981) (noncompete agreement
unreasonable if employer's need is outweighed by the hardship to the em-
ployee and the likely injury to the public).
20. See Buanno v. Weinraub, 226 Ind. 557, 564, 81 N.E.2d 600, 603 (1948);
Foltz v. Struxness, 168 Kan. 714, 722, 215 P.2d 133, 139 (1950); Mail-Well Envel-
ope Co. v. Saley, 262 Or. 143, 155, 497 P.2d 364, 370 (1972); Ruhl v. F.A. Bartlett
Tree Expert Co., 245 Md. 118, 127, 225 A.2d 288, 293 (Ct. App. 1967); Asheville
Assocs., Inc. v. Miller, 255 N.C. 400, 404, 121 S.E.2d 593, 598 (1961).
21. See Tawney v. Mutual Sys. of Md., 186 Md. 508, 521, 47 A.2d 372, 379
(1946) (enforcing covenant would "stifle competition, in a field [issuing loans]
where the existence of competition is clearly in the public interests.").
22. See Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 15, 152-53 (1955); Annot, 43 A.LR. 2d 94, 232-34
(1955).
23. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. Some states have passed
statutes that regulate noncompete agreements under the state's antitrust laws,
superceding the three prong common law test. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 635
n.66; Wetzel, supra note 3, at 63-67. See, e.g., CAi. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600-02
(West 1980); HAw. REV. STAT. § 480-4 (1980); MICH. COM. LAws §§ 445, 761-767
(1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-2 (1979); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1979); OKILA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 217-219 (1980); S.D. CoMp.
LAws ANN. § 53-9-11 (1980). Compare S.D. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 53-9-11 (1980) (al-
lowing noncompete agreements only among licensed professionals within 25
miles for up to 10 years from date of agreement) with FIA. STAT. § 542.33 (2) (a)
(1980) (allowing covenants that restrict employee from carrying on a similar
business and soliciting old customers with reasonable limits on time and area).
The statutes have not necessarily clarified the law. Compare Farren v. Autovi-
able Servs., Inc., 508 P.2d 646, 648 (Okla. 1973) (noncompete agreements valid
only if ancillary to sale of goodwill) with Structural Dynamics Research Corp.
1982]
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trade or commerce among the several states." 24 Although the
language of the Act clearly supports an argument that enforce-
ment of noncompete agreements violates the antitrust laws, all
postemployment restraints litigated under that section have
been eventually upheld.25
Courts have construed section 1 of the Sherman Act to pro-
hibit agreements that "unreasonably" restrain trade; to be "un-
reasonable" under section 1, the restraint must adversely affect
competition in the relevant market.26 The market traditionally
analyzed in antitrust cases is the market for the employer's
goods and services-that is, the product market, not the labor
market.27 Because courts are accustomed to examining the
product market, an employee subject to a noncompete agree-
v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1115 (E.D. Mich.
1975) (covenants not to disclose confidential information valid).
To the extent that these statutes are part of the state's antitrust laws,
noncompete agreements are subject to state antitrust law analysis. Like courts
interpreting the federal antitrust laws, courts interpreting state antitrust laws
have often relied on a common law contract analysis to determine reasonable-
ness. See Miller Mechanical, Inc. v. Ruth, 300 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 1974); Availabil-
ity, Inc. v. Riley, 336 So. 2d 668, 670 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). Consequently, the
analysis under these state statutes does not radically depart from the tradi-
tional state common law test described above.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
25. See, e.g., Bradford v. The New York Times Co., 501 F.2d 51, 59 (2d Cir.
1974); Frackowiak v. Farmers Ins. Co., 411 F. Supp. 1309, 1318-19 (D. Kan. 1976);
Alders v. AFA Corp. of Fla., 353 F. Supp. 654, 656 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Miller v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 339 F. Supp. 1296-97 (E.D. Wis. 1971). Note, however,
that the Bradford and Frackowiak courts merely refused to hold the agree-
ments per se violations of section 1. An apparently successful challenge in Lek-
tro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 403 F. Supp. 527, 532-33 (N.D. Il. 1975), aff'd, 545
F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 623 (1977), was unsuc-
cessful on remand. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 500 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
26. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 57-60 (1910). This rule
developed because, early in the history of the Act, courts recognized that re-
straint was the essence of every contract. If the Act were read literally to pro-
hibit every contract that restrained trade, it would outlaw the entire body of
contract law. Id. at 59-60. Mr. Justice Brandeis once stated the rule incisively.
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
27. See, e.g., Equifax, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 618 F.2d 63,66 (9th Cir.
1980) (merger challenged under Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)); Colum-
bia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20, 26 (3d
Cir. 1978); Eliason Corp. v. National Sanitation Found., 485 F. Supp. 1062, 1075
(D. Mich. 1977), arf'd, 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1980).
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ment must prove that his exclusion from the labor market ad-
versely affected competition in the sale of the employer's
product or service.28 Although individual noncompete agree-
ments have some adverse impact on the product market, the ef-
fect will never be great enough in individual cases to cause a
court using this analytical approach to hold a postemployrnent
restraint invalid.29 Bereft of the requisite adverse product mar-
ket impact, noncompete agreements have been held not to vio-
late section 1 of the Sherman Act.30
I. THE CASE FOR A BROADER APPUCATION
OF ANTITRUST LAW
A. INADEQUACY OF STATE LAW
State law inadequately protects employee and public inter-
ests for at least three reasons. First, the remedy for an em-
ployee whose noncompetition agreement is held invalid
generally is to allow the employer to enforce only the reason-
able terms of the agreement, or to apply the "blue-pencil" doc-
trine, severing the "unreasonable" terms, if distinctly
severable, and enforcing the remainder.3 1 This practice encour-
ages employers to draft overly broad agreements in the belief
that most employees will not challenge the agreement, and that
if they do, the terms will simply be judicially narrowed.32
Second, state law provides inadequate protection because
many courts have not considered all three prongs of the com-
mon law "reasonableness" test. Often, if a court has found a
protectible employer interest, its analysis has not proceeded to
the issue of employee hardship.33 Moreover, of those courts
that have balanced both employer and employee interests,
most have ignored the public's interest.3 4
28. See cases cited in note 94 infra.
29. See notes 94-95 infra and accompanying text.
30. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
31. See Wetzel, supra note 3, at 66. See generally 6A ComN, CoNTRACTS
§ 1390 (1962).
32. Note, Antitrust Implications Arising from the Use of Overly Broad Re-
strictive Covenants for the Protection of Trade Secrets, supra note 14, at 309-10.
33. Professor Blake observed that once courts complete their analysis of
the protectible employer interest, they usually find the relevant considerations
exhausted. The employee interest and public interest branches of the test are
seldom given separate attention. 'This does not mean that the interests of the
employee and the public are necessarily slighted, but only that 'undue hard-
ship' to the employee and 'injury' to the public are measured against the ur-
gency of the employer's claim to protection . ." Blake, supra note 1, at 649-
50.
34. See note 16 supra.
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Most importantly, courts that have employed a contract law
analysis have not considered the crucial antitrust issues. At
best, courts have questioned whether the noncompete agree-
ment created or threatened to create a monopoly under a strin-
gent standard.35 They have not considered the broad goals of
federal antitrust law, nor have they thoroughly analyzed
whether the agreement violates the requirements of section 1
of the Sherman Act.
B. INTERESTS PROTECTED BY ANTITRUST LAw
1. Sherman Act Objectives
The Sherman Act was enacted to preserve competitive
markets,3 6 which economists believe promote well-being by
maximizing consumer satisfaction and minimizing maldistribu-
tions of wealth that occur when prices are unrelated to costs. 37
The Act reflects congressional judgment that competition is the
best method of allocating resources, producing lower prices,
and concomitant higher quality. Congress believed that a bet-
ter bargain results from the free opportunity to choose among
alternatives.3 8
Economic efficiency, however, is not the sole aim of anti-
trust policy. This "comprehensive charter of economic liberty"
also advanced important political objectives. 39 Among these
objectives were the achievement of a viable economy with a
minimum of political interference and the protection of individ-
35. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
36. See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 400
(1921); United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61, 87 (1912).
37. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 486-96 (11th ed. 1970); Blake & Jones, In
Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 381 (1965).
38. The Act 'rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of com-
petitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the low-
est prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress." Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). See also Connell Const. Co. v.
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 623 (1975); Shapiro v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 472 F. Supp. 636, 648 (D. Md. 1979).
39. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). Professors
Blake and Jones maintain that the Act was to be a "bulwark against arbitrary
action and oppression at the hands of the economically powerful ...." Blake
& Jones, supra note 37, at 384. They believe Americans favor freedom of action
and the wide range of choices that freedom implies; competition maximizes
freedom of opportunity for consumers and businessmen. But see Bork, Con-
trasts in Antitrust Theory: 1, 65 COLuM. L. REV. 401 (1965). "Early antitrust pol-
icy developed almost entirely as economic regulation." Id. at 413. "[T]he
political and social values mentioned in connection with antitrust usually turn
out to be either mere rhetorical reinforcement of results arrived at on grounds
of economic analysis or else unstructured mush." Id. at 415.
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ual freedom and opportunity.40 Maintenance of competitive
markets facilitates the attainment of society's political as well
as economic objectives; thus, faith in the value of competition
has long been the heart of our national economic policy.41 Con-
gress intended courts to interpret the Sherman Act in light of
these multiple economic and political policy objectives.4 2 By its
deliberately broad language,43 the Act retains the flexibility to
encompass newly devised restraints on competition and
opportunity.I
In addition to restricting an individual employee's mobility,
noncompete agreements interfere with society's broad interest
in unfettered labor mobility.45 That interest is reflected in the
political antitrust objective of protecting individual freedom
and opportunity. By definition, noncompete agreements ham-
per the economic mobility of employees and impair their ability
to practice their livelihoods,46 impinging on both the individ-
ual's personal interest in freedom of employment and on soci-
ety's interest in protecting that freedom for the greater public
40. See Blake & Jones, supra note 37, at 383.
41. See Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951).
42. "This ... has for its single object to invoke the aid of the courts ... to
supplement the enforcement of the... common and statutory law... in deal-
ing with combinations that affect injuriously the industrial liberty of the citi-
zens of these States." 51 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman).
43. The Senate Finance Committee, of which Sherman was a member, ini-
tially amended the original language to provide more detail. A number of
amendments were also proposed when the bill reached the floor; one specifi-
cally defined terms such as trust, combination, and monopoly. See generally 51
CONG. REc. 2455-731 (1890). Despite these options, the original, more general
language was adopted. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60
(1910).
44. See United States v. E. L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 386
(1956).
45. This societal interest was recognized in Deuerling v. City Baking Co.,
155 Md. 280, 284-85, 141 A. 542, 543-44 (1928), though the noncompete agreement
was enforced. Society's interest in the unrestricted movement of labor is analo-
gous to its interest in free alienability of property. The court in Deuerling em-
phasized that "it is just as essential that men's services be freely for sale as
that property should not be allowed to be withdrawn from the market for an
indefinite length of time," and that both principles were based on sound public
policy. Id. at 284, 141 A. at 544.
46. See Blake, supra note 1, at 646-51. A commentator has observed sev-
eral effects of nondisclosure agreements that are also likely to occur from use
of noncompete agreements. First, the covenants tend to discourage employees
from actively seeking new positions. Second, the covenants diminish an em-
ployee's value to the new employer because the agreements tend to restrict the
employee from using whatever was learned in the prior employment. Third,
employers may be reluctant to hire employees of competitors, fearing a suit to
enforce the restraint. Note, Employee Nondisclosure Covenants and Federal




good. Thus, noncompete agreements contravene an important
political antitrust goal.
2. Product Market Impact
There is a direct impact on competitive markets that state
law currently does not consider. Even when noncompete
agreements do not suppress competition to the extent that
their enforcement threatens to promote a monopoly, they harm
interests protected by the antitrust laws by decreasing compe-
tition in the market of the employer's product. Noncompete
agreements prohibit employees from setting up businesses
against their former employers or from competing against them
in a rival's employ. Consequently, for each ex-employee who
honors a noncompetition agreement, the employer faces one
less potential competitor in the marketplace. The employer's
competition is further reduced by the absence in the market-
place of employees who, but for the deterrence of postemploy-
ment restraints, might consider leaving their employment.4 7
Employers need not fear that rivals will be able to acquire and
exploit their new processes, confidential information, and cus-
tomer relationships by hiring a former employee. In this sense,
noncompete agreements restrain competition in the market for
the employer's product or service, and thus impair the antitrust
objective of promoting competitive markets.
3. Labor Market Impact
In addition to their product market impact, noncompete
agreements have a strong impact on the labor market. Al-
though some courts have felt that noncompete agreements
could benefit the public by creating employment opportunities
for employees not subject to such restraints,48 the courts have
overlooked the possibility that noncompete agreements actu-
ally reduce competition in the labor market. In a perfectly
competitive labor market, each firm is too small to affect the
wage rate by changing its use of labor. Therefore, the supply of
labor curve confronting each producer is a horizontal, perfectly
47. Professor Blake notes: "For every covenant that finds its way to court,
there are thousands which exercise an in terrorem effect on employees who re-
spect their contractual obligations and on competitors who fear legal complica-
tions if they employ a convenantor, or who are anxious to maintain
gentlemanly relations with their competitors." Blake, supra note 1, at 682-83.
48. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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elastic line at the market wage rate.49 A profit maximizing en-
trepreneur will employ units of labor until the value of the mar-
ginal product of labor, the addition to total production for each
additional unit of labor employed, multiplied by the market
price of the commodity produced is equal to the price of labor,
the wage rate.50
An employer's interference with free competition for one of
its former employee's services, therefore, impairs the market's
ability to achieve the most economically efficient allocation of
labor.5 1 A noncompete agreement that prevents an employee
49. See C. FERGUSON & J. GOULD, MICROECONOmIC THEORY 367 (4th ed.
1975).
50. Id. at 369-70. This analysis is analogous to that in the product market,
where the profit maximizing entrepreneur produces when marginal revenue
equals marginal cost, which equals price. See note 82 infra.
Individual Producer Labor Demand & Supply




The individual producer's demand for labor curve, then, is equivalent to the
value of the marginal product (VMP) curve.
The market demand for labor, like the market demand for a product, is the
horizontal sum of the constituent individual demand curves. See C. FERGUSON
& J. GOULD, supra note 49, at 371. Note, however, that a change in the product
price or demand will also affect the demand for the input, or labor. Id. at 375.
The supply of labor that individual workers offer depends on their prefer-
ence for work versus their preference for leisure. The supply curve for individ-
uals is positively sloped because an increase in wage rates results in an
increase in the number of hours they will work and a decrease in the amount of
leisure they prefer. Id. at 381. The market supply of labor, just like the market
supply of a product, is the summation of all of these individual supply curves.
After deriving the market demand and supply for labor, one can determine the
market equilibrium price or the market wage rate by finding the intersection of
supply and demand, just as one determines the price of a commodity in the
product market.
51. See Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1082 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978). The Ninth Circuit found, in Winston Re-
search Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965), cer-
tain restrictions on the disclosure of trade secrets to "limit the employee's
employment opportunities, tie him to a particular employer, and weaken his
bargaining power with that employer. [They] interfere with the employee's
movement to the job in which he may most effectively use his skills." Id. at
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from competing against a former employer artificially de-
creases the supply of that particular type of labor in the geo-
graphic area for the time that the covenant is in force.5 2 If an
agreement, for example, prevented a computer programmer
from competing in a five-state territory for a period of two
years, there would be one less computer programmer available
to other firms in the area for two years. If an employer, or sev-
eral employers, enforced a number of such agreements, the
supply of available programmers could decrease significantly.5 3
Given this decrease in supply, and assuming that demand for
labor remained constant,54 the wage commanded by the re-
maining available programmers not subject to noncompete
agreements would be artificially inflated.55
Noncompete agreements sustain this artificially high price
by inhibiting the market's normal response to an increased
wage rate. Absent market imperfections, an increase in the
wage rate would normally begin to attract new workers to the
market from other occupations or from other localities. These
workers would increase the available supply of labor, and in
the long run the market would reach a new equilibrium.55 La-
bor markets are not, however, perfectly competitive.5 7 Market
imperfections in the form of various immobilities inhibit the
137. Such restrictions harm the public because "[tihey inhibit an employee
from either setting up his own business or from adding his strength to a com-
petitor of his employer, and thus they diminish potential competition. Such re-
strictions impede the dissemination of ideas and skills throughout industry."
Id. at 137-38. The court thus recognized both labor and product market effects.
See also Note, Employee Nondisclosure Covenants and Federal Antitrust Law,
supra note 14, at 426-27 (discussing anticompetitive labor effects of nondisclo-
sure agreements). Professor Blake observes that "[a]nything that impedes an
employee's freedom of access to a job in which his productivity (and wages)
would be higher, involves a cost in terms of the economy's welfare." Blake,
supra note 1, at 650.
52. See Note, Antitrust Implications Arising From the Use of Overly Broad
Restrictive Covenants for the Protection of Trade Secrets, supra note 14 at 306-
07.
53. This supply shift would occur once an employee subject to a noncom-
pete agreement left his or her employment. If the employee remained with the
employer, this shift would not occur, but the agreement would nonetheless
have anticompetitive effects; the free mobility of resources necessary to perfect
competition remains impaired.
54. An increase in the price of the input would probably result in lowered
demand for labor, moderating the wage increase.
55. This analysis is similiar to the analysis of the effect of exclusive or craft
unionism. See C. McCoNNELL, ECONOMICs 612 (8th ed. 1981).
56. For a general analysis of equilibrium, employing both a product and la-
bor market, see id. at 645-48.
57. See, e.g., S. LEvrrAN, G. MANGUM & R. MARSHALL, HUMAN RESOURCES
AND LABOR MARKETS, 131-34 (2d ed. 1976); C. McCoNNELL, supra note 55, at 618;
P. SAMUELSON, supra note 37, at 545.
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ability of the system to reach long-run equilibrium.5 8 Some of
these immobilities are sociological,5 9 others are geographical, 60
and still others are institutional.61 Noncompete agreements are
a form of institutional restraint, preventing workers subject to
their terms from entering the available pool of a particular type
of labor.
Given these immobilities, a diminished supply caused by
noncompete agreements is less likely to return to its original
levels in response to the inflated wages. It is thus unlikely that
the wage and the quantity of labor employed will remain at
their original levels. The individual producer viewing a higher
input price will still employ labor until the value of the margi-
nal product equals the wage, but that equality will occur at a
lower level of resource employment than before.62 Eventually,
of course, market demand for labor would fall somewhat, caus-
ing the wage rate to decline. Employers are likely to employ
fewer workers at the new lower wage level, however, than they
originally employed.63 Noncompete agreements thus act to dis-
turb present equilibrium in the labor market by artificially re-
ducing the labor supply, as well as to impair the market's
ability to achieve long-run equilibrium by hindering the normal
adjustments a competitive market would make to eliminate dis-
equilibrium. Because the agreements artificially inflate the
price of labor, resources are not allocated in accord with eco-
nomic efficiency; noncompete agreements thus cause society to
pay more for a scarce resource than it would under competitive
conditions, thereby thwarting the antitrust goal of preserving
competitive markets.
58. See S. LEvrrAN, G. MANGUMi & R. MARsHALi, supra note 57, at 134, C.
McComzL, supra note 55, at 619.
59. For example, employers may discriminate on the basis of race or sex.
See C. McComEL , supra note 55, at 619-20.
60. Some workers choose to remain in one geographic area and do not re-
spond to attractive opportunities outside that area. Id.
61. Union cards, licensing requirements, and advanced education require-
ments are all examples of institutional market imperfections. Id.
62. This observation is a necessary corollary of the negative slope of the
value of marginal product curve. See C. FERGUSON & J. GOULD, supra note 49, at
370; note 50 supra and accompanying text.
63. The labor market is originally at equilibrium where demand for labor
(D1 ) intersects labor supply (S 1). That intersection determines the quantity of
labor employed (Q1) and the market wage rate (WI). As noncompete agree-
ments are enforced, the supply of available workers (S1 ) decreases (to S2), es-
tablishing a new quantity employed (Q2) at a new higher wage rate (W2).
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4. Oligopolistic Market Impact
So far, this Note has discussed anticompetitive impacts
upon product and labor markets without reference to any par-
ticular industry. The factual proof of adverse competitive im-
pact, in either the product or labor market, clearly would have
to incorporate the characteristics of a given market and its par-
ticipants. In a specific industrial structure, however, wide-
spread use of noncompetition agreements has an additional
antitrust implication for both product and labor market compe-
tition. In an oligopolistic6 4 industry, noncompete agreements








Q 3 Q 2  QiQuantity of Labor
Market demand for labor will fall (to D2 ) because as its price rises, users and
firms, to the extent possible, will try to substitute other inputs for labor, reach-
ing a new equilibrium (at Q3 and W3). See C. FERGUSON & J. GOULD, supra
note 49, at 112. This analysis assumes that the new equilibrium wage and quan-
tity, W3 + Q3, will be respectively higher than and lower than the original wage
and quantity, W1 + Q1, due to restraints on the substitution of capital for labor
and to continued demand for the commodity produced. See C. McCoNNELI,
supra note 55, at 647-48.
64. An oligopolistic industry is a market structure where firms have some
market power (and thus are not price takers as in perfect competition), but are
subject to enough rivalry so that they cannot consider the market demand
curve their own (as in monopoly). An oligopolistic industry consists of a few
firms that are aware of their interdependence. See generally R. LIPSEY & P.
STEINER, ECONOMICS 252-53, 258-66 (5th ed. 1978).
65. One of the criteria that suggests an industry's predisposition to form-
ing cartels is its conditions of entry. "If entry can be effected rapidly and en-
trants have no higher long-run costs than the members of the cartel, the profit
of cartelization will be small, and so also the incentive to cartelize." R. PosNER,
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The computer industry in the United States, for example, is
dominated by a few large firms. Economists have characterized
the industry as oligopolistic or, at least, imperfectly competi-
tive.66 The industry employs a large number of highly skilled
and trained employees, among them computer programmers.
Since computer technology develops rapidly and changes often,
employers have sought to protect the advantages acquired by
new processes and skilled employees. If many firms in the in-
dustry used noncompetition agreements to protect their posi-
tions, the cumulative impact would raise entry barriers to new
firms by severely limiting the available labor supply.
Due to artificially increased wages, existing firms that have
not procured a "loyal" labor supply will experience rising costs
of operation. New firms will have to pay more to hire program-
mers, or incur the costs of training employees new to the pro-
gramming market. These high expenses may deter new firms
from entering the industry, or cause those that do enter to be
less successful.67 The lack of new firms entering the market is
itself harmful because it perpetuates oligopoly, a form of imper-
fect competition.68 Although only expert economic witnesses
can attest to the precise effects in specific industries, courts
and litigants should become aware that increased entry barri-
EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw 214 (2d ed. 1977). Thus, high entry barriers may
encourage exploitation and accumulation of market power.
66. See generally G. BROCK, THE U.S. COMPUTER INDUsTRY 3-24 (1975).
67. While Brock denies that access to skilled personnel constitutes an im-
portant entry barrier, id. at 63, he concludes that current problems in the in-
dustry are primarily the result of the barriers to entry of new firms,
contributing to the high degree of concentration. Id. at 230. Despite his under-
estimation of the importance of labor, Brock found that the area of the most
substantial economies of scale was that of software (programming) and that
one way a small company could overcome this barrier would be to employ
highly skilled and able programmers. Id. at 38. Brock summarizes the disad-
vantages for new entrants in tabular form. See id. at 65.
68. The effect of noncompetition agreements on blocking new entries has
been noted before. See Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1082 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); Note, Antitrust Implications Arising
From the Use of Overly Broad Restrictive Covenants for the Protection of Trade
Secrets, supra note 14, at 315. See also Union Circulation Co. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 241 F.2d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 1957); Blake, supra note 1, at 627.
[Tjhe courts should look to the general use of such restraints in the
industry to determine whether the collective effect of such practices is
to lock-in classes of key employees so as to create a general barrier to
competition.
... [T]he existence of an oligopolistic market structure ... should
cut [against the employer], especially if the other firms in the industry
also restrain key employees.
Sullivan, supra note 1, at 647-48.
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ers are a potential anticompetitive effect of employee covenants
not to compete.
C. JuDIciAL RELUCTANCE TO APPLY ANTITRUST LAw
One explanation for the failure of courts to consider the an-
titrust implications of noncompete agreements may be their re-
luctance to interfere with state contract and trade secret law. 69
Contract law governs the validity of restrictive covenants by
weighing the employer, employee, and public interests.70 In ad-
dition, the law of trade secrets protects many of the same em-
ployer interests that noncompete agreements protect.71 Theft
or disclosure of a trade secret is a competitive tort.72 An em-
ployee may also have a duty not to disclose information under
either an express nondisclosure covenant or an implied term of
the employment contract.73 Finally, disclosure of confidential
information may be a violation of an employee's implied duty
of loyalty or a breach of a fiduciary duty under state corporate
law.7 4
69. The court acknowledges this reluctance in Newburger, Loeb, & Co. v.
Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1082 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978). See
note 75 infra and accompanying text.
70. See notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text.
71. "[E]ven absent covenants not to compete, various doctrines of state
trade secret law will protect the employer against egregious employee miscon-
duct." Sullivan, supra note 1, at 640. Professor Blake notes that an employer is
apt to regard his interests as inadequately protected by traditional remedies.
Blake, supra note 1, at 657. Finding some merit in the employer's position, Pro-
fessor Blake explains how noncompete agreements remedy the alleged
deficiency:
In at least three different ways such covenants may provide protection
beyond that which would otherwise be available. First, they may deter
the employee from leaving his employment ... ; second, if the former
employee violates the covenant, he may be ordered out of the business
entirely rather than subjected only to the less effective order not to so-
licit; finally, an effective covenant may in some cases not only protect
against solicitation of all the employer's actual customers but also
guarantee his exclusive access to potential customers ....
Id. Professor Sullivan observes that noncompetition agreements add only mar-
ginal legal protection at a high cost to competition. Sullivan, supra note 1, at
641 n.94. Some commentators have argued that even trade secret protection
and nondisclosure covenants, both of which have narrower effects than
noncompete agreements, restrain competition "by impeding the mobility and
market value of individual employees." Note, Employee Nondisclosure Cove-
nants and Federal Antitrust Law, supra note 14, at 424-27. See also Note, Anti-
trust Implications Arising From the Use of Overly Broad Restrictive Covenants
for the Protection of Trade Secrets, supra note 14, at 307-08.
72. Note, Employee Nondisclosure Covenants and Federal Antitrust Law,
supra note 14, at 418.
73. Id.




Because of this complex overlap in applicable law, courts
may fear that analyzing noncompete agreements under federal
antitrust law will conflict with analysis of such covenants under
state law.7 5 This fear is unfounded. State contract common law
does not establish that "reasonable" restraints are desirable, it
merely declares that such restraints are not contrary to public
policy.7 6 Thus, even if a court finds a restraint "reasonable"
under contract law, but finds it "unreasonable" under federal
antitrust law, the court does not necessarily intrude upon any
affirmative state policy.7 7
State trade secret law poses no greater problem. An anti-
trust challenge to a contract that merely duplicates state trade
secret protection should result in a finding that the restraint is
reasonable. Most noncompetition contracts, however, provide
more protection than does state trade secret law.7 8 This addi-
tional protection is, of course, the very purpose of the agree-
ment. Subjecting the excess protection to antitrust scrutiny
does not infringe on any affirmative state policies because, by
definition, the "excess" of the restraint is beyond the scope of
state trade secret law.7 9 As a result of this mistaken and exces-
sive judicial deference to state law, courts have ignored the
public interest reflected in the federal antitrust laws.8 0
Another explanation of the judicial reluctance to apply an-
titrust analysis and to ignore "public interest" issues is the mis-
perception by the courts that public and private interests are
congruent. Courts seem to have assumed that the balancing of
employer and employee interests will maximize both societal
75. See Goldschmid, supra note 3, at 1193, 1204, Sullivan, supra note 1, at
662-63.
76. See tests for analyzing restraints under state contract law, notes 6-22
supra and accompanying text.
77. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 662, 663 & n.181.
78. See Note, Employee Nondisclosure Covenants and Federal Antitrust
Law, supra note 14, at 431-32.
79. One commentator has argued that courts should balance the state pol-
icy of protecting trade secrets that supports reasonable nondisclosure cove-
nants against the anticompetitive effect, and should refuse to enforce the
agreement if competition is substantially impaired. See id. at 432. See also Sul-
livan, supra note 1, at 666.
80. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 639, maintains that state restraint of trade
contract common law is overly concerned with the employer's interests, and
thus that undue deference to state law has distorted the appropriate Sherman
Act approach. Id. at 643. "[T]he antitrust law, if it is to be applied to employer
agreements not to compete, must treat common law precedents with a so-far




and individual interests. 81 It is true that in an efficient market
the social cost of preventing employees from accepting new
employment where they would be more productive is equal to
the individual's economic loss. 8 2 In the real economic world
where the relevant market is not perfectly efficient,83 however,
it is erroneous to assert that public and private interests con-
verge and that, therefore, the court need not consider public in-
terests separately.84 In an imperfectly competitive market, the
81. See Blake, supra note 1, at 687. The current practice of ignoring the
public interest factor in the three part test for noncompete clauses supports
this analysis. See note 16 supra and accompanying text. If courts felt there
were no public interests in enforcement or nonenforcement of restrictive cove-
nants, it would seem logical for them to ignore the public interest component in
announcing the test, as a few courts have done. See Dixon v. Royal Cup, Inc.,
386 So. 2d 481, 482 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980). Those courts that retain the require-
ment, yet ignore it, apparently believe that employer and employee interests
adequately assess the public interest. This approach makes sense if there are
no specific public interests and harms. A court unaccustomed to considering
the public interest in preserving competitive markets and the unfettered move-
ment of labor would tend to view a public harm of a postemployment restraint
as identical to its harm to the employee. Furthermore, the only interests actu-
ally presented by litigants to the court appear to be those of the employer and
employee.
82. See Blake, supra note 1, at 687. An efficient market, defined in eco-
nomic terms, is perfectly competitive. A perfectly competitive market meets
four conditions: each seller's product is homogeneous; each market participant
is a price-taker (unable to affect the price because each occupies such a small
part of the market); all resources are completely mobile (able to enter the mar-
ket, leave it, or switch uses readily); and all market participants have perfect
knowledge. E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMIC THEORY AND APPUCATION, 223-24
(1970). Absent externalities, marginal private cost equals marginal social cost
in perfect competition. C. FERGUSON & J. GOULD, supra note 49, at 455-57, 472-73.
The social cost of the restrictive covenant is reduced efficiency, stemming from
the allocation of resources to a less productive use; the private cost, if one as-
sumes a constant labor supply, is the loss to the individual of the potential in-
crease in his wage, measured by the value of the marginal product of labor
(marginal product of labor times price of the product). See id. at 365-71.
83. Perfect competition requires that each supplier be a price-taker and
that the industry has freedom of entry and exit. In a simplified labor market,
workers are the suppliers, and companies are the consumers. Each laborer is a
wage-taker (ie., cannot alter the going price but must passively accept it) and
any worker can leave or enter the labor market at any time. See P. SAMUELSON,
supra note 37, at 540.
84. Public and private interests, for example, are not equivalent when
noncompete agreements diminish competition by intimidating potential com-
petitors, by slowing down the dissemination of ideas and methods, and by in-
hibiting an efficient channelling of labor to maximize productivity. See Blake,
supra note 1, at 627. If restrictive covenants interfere with the efficient alloca-
tion of society's labor resources, the employee's interest will not adequately re-
flect society's interests. The law currently acknowledges that a divergence
between private and social costs might occur if the restraint were used to
monopolize business within a community. Id. at 687. This is the original Re-
statement formulation. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 515(c) (1932); cf. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(1)(b), (2)(b) & comment c (1981)
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decisions of individual units will not necessarily maximize
social welfare.85 Furthermore, even a perfectly competitive
market may be subject to external diseconomies. When dis-
economies are present, private costs do not fully reflect social
costs. 86 Thus, since the labor market is not perfectly competi-
tive,87 and, even if it were, might be subject to externalities, it
is unrealistic to assume that the assessment of private interests
under noncompete agreements adequately maximizes the pub-
lic interest.
Finally, courts may be reluctant to apply antitrust law to
noncompete agreements because they view freedom of contract
as fundamental. In their analysis of restrictive covenants,
courts often refer to the competing principles of "freedom of
contract" and "freedom of trade."88 Freedom of contract re-
(noncompete agreement unreasonable if employer's need is outweighed by the
hardship to the employee and the likely injury to the public). That view is cor-
rect, but does not go far enough in recognizing that costs diverge whenever the
market structure deviates from perfect competition. Employer-employee bar-
gaining will not, as courts mistakenly assume, automatically maximize social
values, because employers will not use such clauses in markets characterized
as perfectly competitive, but only in markets where they have some degree of
market power. See Sullivan, upra note 1, at 643.
85. A perfectly competitive producer will employ a variable input (labor)
until each additional unit adds the same amount to total cost and revenue, that
is, employing the input at a price equal to the value of the marginal product.
The imperfectly competitive producer employs the resource at a price less than
the value of its marginal product and does not use as much of the resource as
is socially desirable. See C. FERGUSON & J. GOULD, supra note 49, at 435.
86. When the actions of one economic decisionmaking unit create good or
bad effects upon other units, economists say external "economies" or "disecon-
omies," respectively, are involved. Since economic decisionmakers only take
into account the benefits and costs they see, private and social costs will di-
verge. For example, the individual employee may not perceive the benefits of
future improved labor market competition because they do not accrue directly
enough; therefore the employee may not be willing to "pay" for that social ben-
efit by refusing to sign a noncompete agreement and incurring the private cost
of a lost employment opportunity. When externalities occur, even perfect com-
petition will not fully maximize social welfare, and action must be taken to ex-
pand situations where external economies occur (to take full advantage of
social benefits being inadequately considered by individuals) or to contract sit-
uations where diseconomies occur (to cut social costs inadequately considered
by private decisionmakers). P. SAMuELSON, upra note 37, at 451-52. For exam-
ples of externalities presented in varying legal contexts see P POSNER, supra
note 65, at 34-35, 140 (discussing property rights and a divergence between pri-
vate and social costs); Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L REV. 393, 398
(1978) (discussing privacy rights and the social costs of disclosure). See also C.
FERGUSON & J. GOULD, supra note 49, at 497-500.
87. See S. LEvrrAN, G. MANGUM & R. MARSHALL, supra note 57, at 131-34.
88. The court in Deuerling v. City Baking Co., 155 Md. 280, 141 A. 542 (1928),
explained the tension well:
Opposed to the unlimited application of this principle of freedom of
trade is the equally well recognized principle of freedom of contract,
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quires that individual employers and employees be free to
strike their own bargains without judicial interference. Free-
dom of trade requires that the law limit the employee's ability
to contract away the freedom to practice a trade or to work.
Enforcing a noncompete agreement necessarily upholds free-
dom of contract, while it demotes freedom of trade.
Although courts acknowledge both concepts, in practice the
doctrine of freedom of contract clearly prevails.89 The explana-
tion may lie in a judicial understanding of freedom of trade as
an archaic concept.9 0 The dominance of freedom of contract,
which in its essence is also natural and inherent in the individual....
And here, again, the public has a real and vital interest, because if, rec-
ognizing the right to contract, one who does contract can, without loss
or penalty, disregard his obligation, there would be [chaos].
Id. at 284, 141 A. at 544. See Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc.,
48 N.Y.2d 84, 89, 397 N.E.2d 358, 360, 421 N.Y.S.2d 842, 849 (1979); Parisian Live
Dyers & Cleaners v. Springfield, 275 S.W. 1098, 1100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
89. For example, in many instances courts merely assess the legitimacy of
the employer interest to be protected without even reaching the hardship to
the employee. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. The implication is
that as long as the contract is freely drawn for "legitimate" purposes, its impact
on freedom of trade is irrelevant.
90. English law is similar in its failure to treat the public interest. In
Nordenfelt v. The Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., [1894] A.C. 535,
the court dropped the prevailing and confusing distinction between general re-
straints, which were always unenforceable as against public policy, and partial
restraints which were enforceable. See Blake, supra note 1, at 630, 642. In-
stead, the court held that restraints might be justified, though generally against
public policy, if they were reasonable in light of the parties' interests and the
public's interests. The reference to the public interest could be interpreted as
judicial reluctance to move too far, too quickly from the older absolute bar to
certain restraints. In Attorney Gen. of Commonwealth of Austl. v. Adelaide
S.S. Co., [1913] A.C. 781, 795 (AustL), the Judicial Committee of the Privy Coun-
cil observed that they were '"not aware of any case in which a restraint though
reasonable in the interests of the parties has been held unenforceable because
it involved some injury to the public." Kores Mfg. Co. v. Kolok Mfg. Co., [1958]
2 All E.R. 65, presented the English courts with an interesting opportunity to
infuse the public interest requirement with some substance, but they declined
to do so. See id. at 75.
The best explanation of the role of the public interest component is found
in Lord Diplock's decision in A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. v. Macaulay,
[1974] 3 All E.R. 616. In that case, Lord Diplock thought it
[sialutory to acknowledge that in refusing to enforce [the contract],
the public policy which the court is implementing is not some 19th cen-
tury economic theory about the benefit to the general public of free-
dom of trade, but the protection of those whose bargaining power is
weak against being forced by those whose bargaining power is stronger
to enter into bargains that are unconscionable .... If one looks at the
reasoning of 19th century judges in cases about contracts in restraint of
trade one finds lip service paid to current economic theories but if one
looks at ... what they did, one finds that they struck down a bargain if
they thought it was unconscionable as between the parties to it, and
upheld it if they thought that it was not.
Id. at 623. Thus, in England the courts recognize no public interest in freedom
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however, means that the adverse impact of noncompete agree-
ments on employee and public interests continues to elude
judicial scrutiny. The courts' reluctance to actually balance
freedom of trade against freedom of contract is, however, mis-
placed; the pull between these competing principles is pre-
cisely the tension that the antitrust "rule of reason" was
designed to resolve.9 1 The rule of reason balances the re-
straint's beneficial effect against its adverse impact on competi-
tion. Under this standard, a restraint is neither automatically
void nor automatically enforceable; neither freedom of contract
nor freedom of trade is an absolute principle.92 Courts could
apply the rule of reason to noncompete agreements by balanc-
ing the employer interests protected and the right of the par-
ties to freely bargain against the potential harm to the
employee and to the public arising from enforcement of the
covenant. Instead of assuming that freedom of contract is pre-
eminent, courts could infuse the principle of freedom of trade
with some substance; the rule of reason would balance and ac-
comodate both of these societal interests.
IV. FOCUSING ANTITRUST ANALYSIS ON
THE LABOR MARKET
A. LABOR MARKET ANALYSIS
The most severe anticompetitive impact of noncompete
agreements occurs in the labor market, rather than the product
market. Although the agreements affect the product market,93
to labor or in competitive labor markets, but merely the interest in fairness.
The test of fairness is whether the restraint is reasonable as between the par-
ties. Arguably, these conclusions are sensible in England where there is no
strong antitrust policy. See Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2,
ch. 68. In the presence of such a policy, as in the United States, the neglect of
the public interest makes less sense.
91. It is ironic that the antitrust rule of reason originated in a restrictive
covenant case where the court used it to balance freedom of trade and freedom
of contract. See Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B.
1711). See also National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 688-89 (1978) (explaining Mitchell); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 51-57 (1911); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th
Cir. 1898), ajfd as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
92. The optimum balance between freedom of contract and freedom of
trade present in the antitrust rule of reason is similar to the three part common
law test of the reasonableness of noncompete agreements. The current reluc-
tance of courts to weigh fully freedom of trade demonstrates judicial practice,
common to courts employing the three part test, of inadequately considering
the public interest in employment restraints. See notes 16-22 supra and accom-
panying text.
93. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
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that effect is attenuated. Given the number of factors influenc-
ing a firm's sales and its rivals' sales, it is unlikely that any em-
ployee could prove that elimination of one individual's labor
services affected the product market. Consequently, the courts
that have applied a product market antitrust analysis to
noncompete agreements have upheld these agreements. 94
The impact of noncompete agreements on the labor mar-
ket, however, is far more significant, since they restrain the em-
ployees' labor and not the employers' products. The restrictive
covenant directly reduces the labor supply, and impairs the
market's ability to reach equilibrium, thus incurring disadvan-
tages of a noncompetitive market that the antitrust laws were
designed to prevent.9 5 Moreover, labor market analysis is not a
novel approach for courts or economists. Courts have already
used it in their antitrust analysis of restraints in professional
sports and of no-switching agreements, 96 and economists have
94. Several cases illustrate the problem. In Newburger, Loeb & Co. v.
Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978), the
court dismissed an employee's antitrust counterclaim against his former em-
ployer for destruction of an employment opportunity with another company.
The court concluded that the employee failed to show sufficient "anticompeti-
tive impact, industry practice, etc." to document his assertion that the restraint
was unreasonable. Id. at 1083. While the court did not specify the particular
market in which anticompetitive impact should have been shown, it appears
from this language that the court focused on the securities market, that is, the
product market. The court emphasized the interest of the employer (a broker-
age firm) in preventing former employees from taking customer accounts to
competing firms. Id. at 1082-83. In Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 500 F.
Supp. 332 (N.D. Ill. 1975), an employee who sought to enjoin recovery of a judg-
ment against him for violation of an anticompetition agreement on grounds that
the covenant violated the antitrust laws failed to establish that the restrictive
covenant adversely affected the market or competition. Id. at 355. The court
clearly was looking for product market impact. Id. at 350.
Emphasis on the product market was explicit in United States v. Empire
Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 307-08 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
The government contended that Empire had violated § I of the Sherman Act by
obtaining numerous covenants not to compete from employees (over 3,000 em-
ployee covenants in 8 years). The government argued that many of the em-
ployees did not have customer contact or access to confidential information
warranting protection, that the covenants were unnecessarily restrictive in area
and time, and that the practice of obtaining agreements from such a large
number of potential competitors in itself restrained trade regardless of the va-
lidity of individual contracts. The court held for defendant Empire because the
government failed to meet its burden of showing that any of the 3,000 contracts
was unreasonable. The court specifically required a showing of impact on com-
petition in the product market, noting that "the record is barren as to the actual
effect of these covenants on competition in the LP retail market." Id. at 308.
95. See notes 48-63 supra and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453-54
(1957); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 616-18 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
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long scrutinized the labor market.
The professional sports cases seem to provide an apt com-
parison to noncompete agreement cases. The courts, due to the
labor intensive nature of the profession, have been unable to
avoid an indirect analysis of the labor market effects of employ-
ment restraints challenged under the antitrust laws. Since the
product market in those cases (the game) is highly dependent
on the labor market (the players), causing any post employ-
ment restraint on the players to directly affect the quality of
the product, the cases do not necessarily imply that courts will
currently use a labor market analysis in different circum-
stances. With such a clear nexus between the product and
labor market, however, courts in the professional sports cases
have not hesitated to find antitrust violations. 97
Courts have experienced more difficulty finding antitrust
violations in the use of no-switching agreements, in which em-
ployers agree not to hire one another's employees. In these
cases, the connection between product and labor markets is
more fragile, depending upon the particular industry, and
courts have differed in the degree to which they are willing to
focus directly on labor market effects. One court focused on
the encyclopedia product market and invalidated the no-
switching agreement, reasoning that the agreement might im-
pair competition in the supply of a service or commodity to the
public.98 Another court acknowledged both labor market and
product market effects of no-switching agreements between
magazine subscription solicitation agencies, but failed to ex-
plain whether the labor market effects were an independent
ground for the holding, or merely relevant to the reasonable-
ness of the no-switching agreements. 9 9 The court considered
the actual and potential impact of such agreements on the in-
97. See cases in note 96 supra.
98. Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 335-57 (7th Cir. 1967).
Acknowledging that the antitrust laws were not enacted to preserve freedom in
the labor market or to regulate employment practices as such, the court never-
theless concluded that no-switching agreements restricted freedom to enter
into employment relationships and thus impaired competition in the supply of
a service. Id. at 335-36.
In Quinonez v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 540 F.2d 824 (5th Cir.
1976), the court held that agreements among security brokerage firms to deny
employment to sales persons who were discharged by another firm, which al-
legedly impaired competition among the defendants, were sufficient as a matter
of law to state a claim under the Sherman Act, but did not explain whether the
labor market effect was independently significant. Id. at 829.




dustry's competitive structure, finding that labor market effects
were crucial to an accurate evaluation of the industry's struc-
ture. 0 0 Finally, one court looked directly at the labor market
impact of no-switching agreements among brokerage firms that
also provided for fixed sales commissions, and found those ef-
fects within the ambit of antitrust prohibition.lOl Despite their
diversity in approach, the cases are important because they
considered in an antitrust context the labor market effects of
agreements regarding post employment restraints.
The similar effects of noncompetition and no-switching
agreements on the market further strengthen the analogy be-
tween the two covenants. 0 2 Both agreements hamper em-
ployee mobility and have a potential anticompetitive effect on
the industry. In fact, a noncompete agreement can have an
even greater deleterious effect on competition than a no-switch-
ing agreement, since a no-switching agreement restricts em-
ployee mobility only within the group of employers party to the
agreement, while a noncompete agreement may effectively pre-
vent an employee from working for any competitor in the same
industry. If no-switching agreements violate the antitrust laws,
noncompetition agreements that adversely affect competition
are, a fortiori, illegal.103
B. OVERCOMING RESISTANCE TO THE LABOR
MARKET APPROACH
Despite the significant anticompetitive impact of noncom-
pete agreements on the labor market, courts have been reluc-
tant to analyze that market because they fear the approach
does not satisfy the Sherman Act's interstate commerce re-
100. Id. The court found that no-switching agreements would diminish
competition between existing agencies and would prevent potential competi-
tors from entering the business by freezing the labor supply. Id. Since the in-
dustry's composition might become static to the advantage of the large, well-
established agencies and to the disadvantage of infant organizations, the court
concluded that the agreements impaired competition and violated section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), and section 5(a) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976). The court did not examine impact on
magazine sales, as a product market approach would dictate.
101. Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Although
the court found that the agreement to reduce brokerage commissions was
analogous to illegal price-fixing, it further observed that the agreement could
restrain mobility on the part of the employees who would otherwise have the
opportunity, in a competitive market for services, to move to higher paid posi-
tions. Id. at 606.
102. See Note, Antitrust Implications Arising From the Use of Overly Broad




quirement, or is rendered useless by the Clayton Act's labor
exemption. The commerce clause and the labor exemption,
however, present no barriers to a labor market antitrust analy-
sis of noncompete agreements.
Courts may feel compelled to focus on the product market
because the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act requires
that the restraint affect interstate markets and the interstate
flow of goods.10 4 The statute specifically prohibits "every con-
tract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States." 0 - Courts have not often
thought in terms of an interstate commerce in labor; therefore,
they continue to perceive the interstate market in terms of
goods and services. 0 6 Since 1937, however, courts have con-
strued the commerce clause to give Congress broad power over
both interstate and intrastate activities, including labor-man-
agement relations.l07 The Supreme Court has construed the
Sherman Act to reach local activities that "substantially and
adversely affect" commerce. 0 8 Therefore, an anticompetitive
impact, either in an interstate product market or in an intra-
state market that "affected" interstate trade in that product,
would clearly bring a noncompetition agreement within the
reach of the interstate commerce requirement. Labor market
impacts "affect" interstate commerce in the same manner as
product market impacts. A noncompetition agreement that re-
stricted employment in more than one state would clearly in-
volve interstate commerce for labor. Similarly, a more limited
local covenant might "affect" interstate trade in labor by, for
example, decreasing supply in that locality, thus impairing sup-
ply in a several-state area.
The interstate commerce provision has not forestalled anti-
trust analysis of analogous no-switching agreements that obvi-
ously impede labor mobility. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged the federal antitrust jurisdiction of postemploy-
104. See, e.g., Frackowiak v. Farmers Ins. Co., 411 F. Supp. 1309, 1314 (D.
Kan. 1976).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
106. The plaintiff in Frackowiak v. Farmers Ins. Co., 411 F. Supp. 1309, 1314
(D. Kan. 1976), mistakenly couched his argument in terms of the product mar-
ket, alleging that the noncompete clause prevented the free flow of insurance
coverage. Since the plaintiff did not sell insurance, but only trained agents, the
court found that his elimination from the employment market did not have
"any effect whatsoever upon the quantity, quality, price, or 'free flow' of insur-
ance policies available... in the interstate market." Id. at 1314.
107. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 117-24 (1941), National La-
bor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 29-32 (1937).
108. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974).
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ment restraints in its holding that "ships and those who operate
them are instrumentalities of commerce and within the com-
merce clause no less than cargoes."' 09 Nor has the interstate
commerce requirement immunized professional sports from
the antitrust laws. 110 A team blacklisting agreement, for exam-
ple, could impair the quality of service provided, a product mar-
ket effect, as well as impair freedom of employment, a labor
market effect. The Supreme Court has held that a player who
claimed he was denied employment opportunities because of
an alleged blacklisting agreement did state a cause of action
under section 4 of the Clayton Act.ll
Courts may also be reluctant to use the labor market analy-
sis because they believe the Clayton Actl12 exempts labor from
antitrust examination. Section 6 states that "the labor of a
human being is not a commodity or article of commerce."' 13
Defendants in a number of cases involving labor market re-
straints have argued that a noncompete agreement could not,
under section 6, violate the antitrust laws as a matter of law."14
If labor is not an article of commerce, they argue, contracts,
combinations, or conspiracies that restrain labor do not re-
strain interstate commerce, and thus do not violate section 1 of
the Sherman Act.
The statutory labor exemption, however, should not pre-
vent the application of antitrust law to noncompete agree-
ments."15 Although the literal language of section 6 appears to
109. Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n of the Pacific Coast, 272 U.S. 359, 363
(1926) (emphasis added).
110. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 616 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). The court noted the Sherman Act's
interstate commerce requirement, observing that the NFL "operates in inter-
state commerce." Id. at 616 n.19. The court found important labor market
effects of the challenged Rozelle rule, which gave the commissioner the free-
dom, whenever a player became a free agent and signed a contract with a new
club, to award players of the acquiring club to the former club as compensa-
tion. The court found that the rule deterred clubs from negotiating with and
signing free agents, and thus deterred players from becoming free agents, de-
creased players' bargaining power in contract negotiations, and denied players
the right to sell their services in a free and open market. Id. at 620.
111. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 448-49 (1957). The
Clayton Act contains a similar commerce provision. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976).
112. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976)).
113. Id. § 6 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976)).
114. See, e.g., Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 616-17 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Quinonez v. National Ass'n of
Sec. Dealers, Inc., 540 F.2d 824, 828-29 (5th Cir. 1976); Nichols v. Spencer Int'l
Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 337 (7th Cir. 1967).
115. In addition to a statutory labor exemption, courts have created a non-
statutory exemption that protects some collective bargaining agreements that
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exempt labor restraints from antitrust scrutiny, the language
must be read in context. Courts have held that the sole pur-
pose of the exemption was to permit the existence of labor un-
ions, agricultural associations, and other organizations that
would otherwise violate the antitrust laws by engaging in a col-
lective activity such as a strike.1 16 The language immediately
following the exemption explains its purpose: "Nothing con-
tained in the antitrust law shall be construed to forbid... la-
bor..., organizations.., nor shall such organizations, or the
members thereof, be held ... to be illegal combinations or con-
spiracies in restraint of trade .... -117
In both the no-switching and professional sports cases,
courts have specifically rejected defendants' arguments that
section 6 precludes antitrust analysis of the agreement at is-
sue.1 8 The court in Cesnik v. Chrysler Corp.,119 observing that
the Supreme Court interprets section 6 as providing labor
have anticompetitive effects. See Note, Establishing an Objective Intent Stan-
dard for the Labor Antitrust Exemption: Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New
York Shipping Association, 64 MIN. L RFv. 1275, 1284-85 (1980). The policy
supporting exemption seeks "to balance the concern of antitrust law-the pres-
ervation of a competitive economy-with that of labor law-the regulation of
the struggle for power between unions and employers in which unions seek to
achieve a monopoly over the labor supply." Id. at 1292. Traditional interpreta-
tions of the exemption protect an agreement from antitrust scrutiny if it is not
a business conspiracy, and if it is intimately related to a legitimate union goal.
Id. at 1282. As long as a collectively bargained restrictive covenant met these
criteria, it would be exempt. Under more recent tests that place greater em-
phasis on the actual and potential anticompetitive effects of the bargaining
agreement, the noncompete agreement might not qualify for exemption. The
answer depends on the resolution of this labor law dispute. For the purposes
of this Note it is sufficient to observe that the non-statutory exemption, like the
statutory labor exemption, presents no barriers to the antitrust scrutiny of non-
collectively bargained restrictive covenants.
116. Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 335 (7th Cir. 1967). For
an excellent discussion of this exemption and its inapplicability to no-switching
agreements, see Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600, 605-08 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
117. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 17 (1976)).
118. See Quinonez v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 540 F.2d 824, 829
(5th Cir. 1976); Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 335 (7th Cir.
1967); Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In Qui-
nonez, the court specifically rejected the applicability of the section 6 labor ex-
emption, noting that the defendant brokerage firms were not labor
organizations and the alleged agreements seemed "primarily designed to re-
strict the movement of the labor force in the industry rather than promote any
legitimate labor objective." Id. at 829 n.9. See also Mackey v. National Football
League, 543 F.2d 606, 617 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
119. 490 F. Supp. 859 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
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union protection,120 rejected defendant's contention that sec-
tion 6 barred plaintiff's suit, and instead concluded, in light of
prior cases, 121 that "the market for employee skills is a market
subject to the provisions of the Sherman Act."122 The court
reasoned that alleged restraints on competition for employee
services could be a form of restraint on trade under section 1 of
the Sherman Act.123 The analysis shows that the antitrust laws
do not prevent courts from focusing on labor market effects of
noncompete agreements.
V. A SUGGESTED APPROACH
Determining the boundaries of the relevant market is tradi-
tionally an important inquiry in antitrust cases.124 Generally,
the outer boundaries of the product market are determined by
the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity
of demand between the product itself and its substitutes. 25
Within that broad market submarkets may exist, defined by in-
dustry or public recognition of the submarket, the product's pe-
culiar characteristics or uses, unique production facilities,
distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, or specialized ven-
120. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S.
797, 803-05 (1944).
121. See Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n of the Pacific Coast, 272 U.S. 359, 363
(1926); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 617-18 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Quinonez v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers,
540 F.2d 824, 828-29 (5th Cir. 1976).
122. 490 F. Supp. at 864. Applying the rule of reason, the court found that
plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the restraint was calculated to prejudice the
public interest. Id. at 867. While the court based its decision on the lack of
public injury, it also found that the restraint was reasonable under a rule of
reason analysis. Id. at 868. Although the court used the more liberal "ancillary
to sale of business" test of reasonableness, it would have been more appropri-
ate to use the the more restrictive "ancillary to employment" test. See Blake,
supra note 1, at 646-48. The sale of business test holds that a restraint is rea-
sonable if it is calculated to protect the purchaser's interest in the business's
goodwill, and unreasonable if its true purpose is to foster monopoly. 490 F.
Supp. at 868. The court found that the purpose of the agreement was to in-
crease the likelihood that the purchaser would enjoy the services of exper-
ienced employees (who were treated like goodwill of the business). The court
found no reason to infer that the agreement fostered a monopoly on the market
for employee services or any other market. Id. The use of the liberal sale of
business test explains the court's failure to find either public injury or unrea-
sonableness. The case's significance lies in its recognition of the labor market
as a legitimate market for antitrust analysis.
123. Id. at 864.
124. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
125. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962); United States v. E. L du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394-95 (1956).
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dors.126 These same criteria can determine the boundaries and
submarkets of the employee service or labor market.127 Econo-
mists have long recognized labor markets as legitimate objects
of inquiry;12 8 their testimony should assist courts in defining
the relevant labor market for particular agreements.
Analyzing the labor market should be no more difficult
than analyzing the traditional product market. Professor Sulli-
van has devised seven factors in a product market context 129
that courts can use as practical guides to assess the antitrust
implications of employee noncompete agreements in the labor
market. Under this approach, courts should: 1) look at the
totality of the employer's restraints, not only at the particular
contract in issue;130 2) examine the industry-wide use of re-
straints to determine whether collectively they create general
barriers to competition by locking in key employees;131 3) as-
sess the general state of competition in the relevant market;132
4) inquire into the scope or force of the restraint; 33 5) consider
126. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
127. There is an exception, however, of unique production facilities, which
could be reformulated as unique training facilities.
128. See notes 48-63 supra and accompanying text.
129. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 647-50. Sullivan actually developed only six
factors, but since the sixth factor includes two components, this Note, for clar-
ity, treats them as seven factors.
130. The number of contracts by one employer may, by their multitude, cre-
ate a measurable effect on either the product or labor market, while one con-
tract alone may have no empirically discernible impact. Furthermore, the focus
on only one contract understates the antitrust impact of noncompete agree-
ments because it ignores the potentially significant number of employees
whose mobility is impaired because of the agreement's deterrent effects. See
Sullivan, supra note 1, at 647.
131. A restraint that appears insignificant to an individual firm may have
important adverse labor market effects if employed by a large number of firms
in the industry. One effect may be to raise barriers to the entry of new firms, a
condition that makes the long-run costs of a new entrant into a market higher
than the long-run costs of the existing firms in the market. See R. POSNER,
supra note 65, at 227-28.
132. A reduction in competitiveness in a labor market approximating per-
fect competition would not violate antitrust policies as seriously as would an-
ticompetitive practice in a less competitive market. This factor simply urges
courts to consider the restraint's effect in the context of the relevant market.
See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 648.
133. Courts should examine whether the employee is merely forbidden
from copying the employer's list of customers and then soliciting that business
for himself, or whether the employee is forbidden from working in any capacity
related to his current one for any employer anywhere in the United States.
Clearly a narrower restraint would have less adverse competitive impact than a
broader restraint. Even a fairly narrow restraint, however, would not be justi-
fied if its avowed purpose is to protect employer interests already protected in
a less restrictive manner by state unfair competition and trade secret law. A
court should thus ask what interests the employer is attempting to protect,
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the nature of the employee being restrained; 3 4 6) closely ex-
amine employer motivations;135 and 7) adopt the majority
American rule that the proponent of a trade restraint bears the
burden of proving it reasonable.13 6 In analyzing the antitrust
whether state law already protects these interests, and whether the restraint
impairs the employee's mobility-and thus labor market competition-moder-
ately or severely.
134. If the employees were sufficiently important in the industry involved,
decreased competition in the labor market might adversely affect competition
in the employer's product market. In a recent work on the structure of the
computer industry, Professor Brock found that the area of the most substantial
economies of scale is that of software. In the extreme case, software has effec-
tively zero marginal cost because of the insignificant cost of duplicating a tape
of the program. G. BROCK, supra note 66, at 38. The link between a labor mar-
ket restraint and impact on product market competition is admittedly attenu-
ated, and is provable only in certain fact situations. The courts' unrealistic and
rigid imposition of this factor as the only test of impact under current interpre-
tations does not deny the factor's usefulness under a more comprehensive
approach.
135. While arguably difficult problems of proof might be raised, the antitrust
laws have often required examination of a defendant's motives. For example,
they require that intent to monopolize be proved in a case under section 2 of
the Sherman Act, or that a union prove lack of business conspiracy to qualify
for the non-statutory exemption. In addition, illegitimate motives could proba-
bly be inferred from the defendant's failure to prove legitimate justifications for
the restraint.
An employer who intends only to protect confidential information and cus-
tomer relations with a noncompetition agreement would not be likely to con-
sider the restraint's labor market impact. The judicial balancing process must
nevertheless weigh both product and labor market impacts against the em-
ployer's justifications. Omitting labor market impact from that calculation en-
courages a finding of legitimate employer justification. The requirement that
courts examine the labor market effects of noncompetition agreements implies
that employer justifications must be stronger than they have been in the past
to prevail. At the same time, recognition that noncompete agreements ad-
versely affect the labor market illuminates a host of potentially illegitimate em-
ployer interests. For example, an employer's desire to raise entry barriers to
new competition or to increase labor costs, thus decreasing the profit margins
of existing rivals by restricting the availability of key employees, is an illegal
objective under the Sherman Act.
136. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 649. "[T]he burden of showing unreason-
ableness of a restraint of trade, except where there is a per se violation... is
on the plaintiff." United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 308 (8th Cir.
1976).
Currently the employee must prove that the restraint is unreasonable by
showing adverse impact on competition in the product market. If the employer
had the burden of proving reasonableness of the restraint, the employee chal-
lenging the restraint would present a prima facie case of unreasonableness
merely by proving the agreement's existence, forcing the employer to rebut the
claim of unreasonableness by coming forward with legitimate justifications for
the restraint. The employee could respond with evidence attesting to the re-
straint's adverse competitive impact on both the labor and product markets.
Since the burden of persuasion would also fall on the employer, the employee
would receive the benefit of the doubt in close cases. This simple procedural
shift in the burden of proof would increase the employee's chance of demon-
strating that a noncompetition agreement violates the antitrust laws.
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impact of noncompete agreements on the labor market, courts
should give full emphasis to the labor market as an important
independent area of investigation. 3 7 The courts should avoid
reliance on a product market bootstrap while continuing to de-
fine and analyze the product impact separately. The labor mar-
ket definition and analysis would supplement, not replace,
product market investigation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Current analysis of noncompete agreements under state
contract law inadequately protects employee and public inter-
ests. The few cases that have raised the antitrust implications
of such agreements have been unsuccessful largely because
courts analyze the agreement's impact on the product market
instead of on the labor market. The agreement's major an-
ticompetitive effect, however, occurs in the labor market and it
is that market that courts should examine. The shift in focus
advocated by this Note would enable employees to defend the
interests that the antitrust laws protect.
137. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 617 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Cesnik v. Chrysler Corp., 490 F. Supp.
859, 864 (M.D. Tenn. 1980). See also note 110 supra.
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